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19571 RECENT DECISIONS
planation 3 2 Judge Burke, in Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 33
maintained that "indecency" was clearly defined, for the purpose of
the instant case, by reference to Section 1140b of the Penal Law 34
which makes a misdemeanor any exposition by a person of his pri-
vate parts in the presence of two or more persons of the opposite
sex, whose private parts are similarly exposed. That a term in one
statute can satisfy the requirement of a "clearly drawn" statute by
reference to an entirely different statute is questionable. In any case.
the definition is insufficient as a full definition of "indecent," since,
as conceded by Judge Burke, it is applicable only to facts similar to
those of the instant case.33 Since licensing statutes will be subject to
close examination by the Supreme Court 36 some revision of the New
York statute seems necessary. It is unfortunate, therefore, that
Judge Desmond's opinion is not too helpful to the legislators who
will be faced with the task of defining and clarifying so nebulous an
area.
NEW YORK PRACTICE - EVIDENCE - TESTIMONY GIVEN AT
LUNACY INQUEST BY DEcEASED WITNESSES HELD ADMISSIBLE IN
PROBATE PROCEEDING.- Decedent was declared insane in 1930,
approximately nine months after executing a will. When she died in
1952, the will was denied probate on the basis of testimony given by
two witnesses at the lunacy proceeding. These two witnesses were
themselves deceased at the time of probate, but their prior testimony
was admitted under Section 348 of the New York Civil Practice Act.'
The Court of Appeals, by a divided court, held that the testimony
32 N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 122a (Supp. 1957) defines those terms previously held
unconstitutional (see note 31 supra), but gives no definition of "obscene!' or
"indecent."
33 3 N.Y2d 237, 253, 144 N.E2d 31, 41 (dissenting opinion).
34 N.Y. Pm. LAw § 1140b (1951).
8 5Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 3 N.Y.2d 237, 253, 144 N.E2d 31, 41
(1957) (dissenting opinion).36 "[A] ssuming that a state may establish a system for the licensing of mo-
tion pictures ... our duty requires us to examine the facts of the refusal of
a license in each case to determine whether the principles of the First Amend-
ment have been honored." Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952)
(concurring opinion). See also Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 244 F.2d 432
(7th Cir.), rezld, - U.S. - (Nov. 12, 1957).
1 The statute provides that ". . . the testimony of the decedent ... taken
or read in evidence at the former trial or hearing ... may be given or read in
evidence . . . upon any subsequent trial or hearing . . . of the same subject-
matter in the same or another action or special proceeding between the same
parties to such former trial or hearing, . . . by either party to such subsequent
action or special proceeding. . . ." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 348.
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was properly admitted in the probate proceeding because the parties
and subject matter in that proceeding were the same as those in the
lunacy inquest. Matter of White, 2 N.Y.2d 309, 141 N.E.2d 416
(1957).
The operation of the hearsay rule has usually been suspended in
cases of necessity where the evidence offered would otherwise be im-
possible to obtain,2 and in cases where there is a high probability that
the statement offered is trustworthy.3 Common instances of testi-
mony admitted under the above rationale include spontaneous dec-
larations,4 and declarations against interest.5
The circumstances surrounding such exceptions to the hearsay
rule are deemed sufficient to outweigh the principal objections to the
use of hearsay: lack of opportunity to cross-examine the witness, to
hear his testimony under oath, or to observe his conduct on the stand.6
The admission of testimony given in one proceeding at a later pro-
ceeding is permitted by common law when the parties and issues are
the same in both proceedings. 7 A statute in New York provides for
the admission of such prior testimony when the parties and "subject-
matter" are the same.8 All such admissions are, of course, subject
to the other normal rules of evidence. 9
In cases involving such former testimony, some authorities say
the requirements of the hearsay rule have been satisfied at the first
proceeding. 10 Others feel the admission of former testimony consti-
tutes an exception to, and not a satisfaction of, the hearsay rule."
2 United States v. Wescoat, 49 F.2d 193 (4th Cir. 1931) ; Southern Under-
writers v. Boswell, 141 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), aff'd, 138 Tex.
255, 158 S.W.2d 280 (1942).
3 United States v. Wescoat, note 2 supra; Lebrun v. Boston & M.R.R.,
83 N.H. 293, 142 Atl. 128 (1928); Raymond v. Shell Oil Co., 165 Ore. 11,
103 P.2d 745 (1940) ; 5 WIGMORE EVIDENC § 1420 (3d ed. 1940).
4 See, e.g., Froman v. Banquet Barbecue, 284 Mich. 44, 278 N.W. 758(1938) ; Rudisill v. Cordes, 333 Pa. 544, 5 A.2d 217 (1939) ; Collins v. Equitable
Life Ins. Co., 122 W. Va. 171, 8 S.E.2d 825 (1940).
5 See, e.g., Wirthlein v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 56 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1932);
Kittredge v. Grannis, 244 N.Y. 168, 155 N.E. 88 (1926); Republic Iron &
Steel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 302 Ill. 401, 134 N.E. 754 (1922); Rudisill v.
Cordes, note 4 supra.
6 See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913); Ellicott v.
Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 179 (1836); Appalachian Stave Co. v. Pickard, 266
Ky. 565, 99 S.W.2d 472 (1936); 5 WIGMORE, EviDENcE § 1362 (3d ed. 1940).
7 Jackson v. Lawson, 15 Johns. R. 539, 544 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818);
RIcHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 278 (8th ed. 1955). See Varnum v. Hart, 47 Hun 18,
25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 1888), rev'd on other grounds, 119 N.Y. 101, 23 N.E.
183 (1890) ("same questions"). But see Cohen v. Long Island RR., 154 App.
Div. 603, 139 N.Y. Supp. 887 (1st Dep't 1913) (the cause of action need not
be the same in both cases if the same "subject-matter" is involved).
8 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 348.
9 Ibid.
L0 RICHARDsoN, EvrDENCE § 275 (8th ed. 1955) ; 5 WIGMORE, EviDEmcE § 1370
(3d ed. 1940).
11 George v. Davie, 201 Ark. 470, 145 S.W.2d 729 (1940); MCCORMICEK,
EviDrECNc § 230 (1954).
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It is settled, however, that the opportunity for cross-examination af-
forded at the first trial need not have been exercised to satisfy the
hearsay rule. As long as such opportunity was presented, the re-
quirements of the hearsay rule have been met.' 2
In dealing with the admission of former testimony, the common-
law term "identity of issues" has been changed in New York to
require only that the "same subject-matter" be involved in both
proceedings.' 3 The identity of issues has historically been regarded
as more important than the requirement of identity of parties.' 4 This
latter requirement can be relaxed where the parties involved in the
two proceedings, while not exactly identical, have the same interest
or motive in the conduct and outcome of the proceedings. 15 This
similarity of interests is usually found where the evidence of the parties
in both cases has the same bearing on, and relation to, the issues
presented.16 A second example of such relaxation is provided where
the difference in parties is only nominal. The omission of parties
once interested in the testimony will not preclude its use in a later
proceeding, provided the parties in the later proceeding are otherwise
substantially identical with those in the earlier action.17
In the instant case, the majority admitted that the lunacy and
probate proceedings had "technically different" purposes.- It- held,
however, that there was no "substantial difference" between them be-
cause the decree in either case hinged on the fact of mental incom-
petency. Therefore it held that the "subject-matter" in both pro-
ceedings was sufficiently alike to satisfy the statute. The Court also
held the parties to be the same in both proceedings within the purview
of the statute and said that an opportunity for cross-examination had
been afforded in the first proceeding but had been waived.
The dissent equated the statutory term "subject-matter" with the
common-law term "identity of issues." It stressed that the issues of
testamentary capacity and insanity are not the same and said therefore
22 Bradley v. Merick, 91 N.Y. 293 (1883).
13 N.Y. CoDe Cir. Paoc. § 830, as amended by Laws of N.Y. 1899, c. 352,
forms the basis of New York Civil Practice Act § 348.14 In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 67 AUt. 497 (1907) ; 5 WIGMOPE, EvInCEc
§ 1388 (3d ed. 1940).
is McCoRmIc, EVIDENcE: § 232 (1954).
16 See, e.g., Stephens v. Hoffman, 263 Ill. 197, 104 N.E. 1090 (1914) ; Indus-
trial Comm'n v. Bartholome, 128 Ohio St. 13, 190 N.E. 193 (1934); Lyon v.
Rhode Island Co., 38 RI. 252, 94 AUt. 893 (1915).
17 See, e.g., Philadelphia W. & B.R.R. Co. v. Howard, 54 U.S. (13 How.)
512 (1851); Allen v. Chouteau, 102 Mo. 309, 14 S.W. 869 (1890) ; McCoRmicK,
EVIDENcE §232 (1954); 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1388. See also Bartlett v.
Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 349 Mo. 13, 160 S.W.2d 740 (1942), where testi-
mony given by two witnesses in an action brought by a husband for loss of his
wife's services was admitted in a later personal injury action brought by the
wife against the same defendant, the wife's claim being based on the identical
assignment of negligence as the husband's. The court said the testimony was
admissible because there was not only an identity of issue in the two cases but
also a "complete identity of interest between Mr. Bartlett and his wife."
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that the statutory requirement of "same subject-matter" had not been
met. Moreover, the dissent reasoned that there was no adequate
opportunity for cross-examination in the first proceeding because there
was no motive or incentive to examine witnesses on the issue of tes-
tamentary capacity. It did not appear that the parties in the lunacy
proceeding even knew .a will existed. Without a motive to cross-
examine, the dissent said, the spirit of the hearsay rule was violated.
The decision is illustrative of the judicial tendency to liberalize
the application of the hearsay rule.' 8 Implicit in the majority's opin-
ion would seem to be a construction of "subject-matter" that carries
a broader meaning than "issue" as used in the dissent. But the
limits of the term "subject-matter" are never explained. It would
seem that in the absence of any knowledge of the will's existence at
the time of the lunacy proceeding, the opportunity afforded to parties
who were to become proponents of the will to cross-examine on the
question of testamentary capacity was more illusory than real. There
could be no effective cross-examination in the absence of any motive
which could give a purposeful direction to the questioning.'"
The relevancy of such questioning would also 6e open to objec-
tion.20 Nor does the statement of the Court that the decrees in
lunacy and probate proceedings both ".. . depend on the fact of men-
tal incompetency . . .2"2L make the issues identical. A lunacy pro-
ceeding is constituted to ". . . inform the conscience of the court as
to a particular fact, for a special purpose .... ,, 22 i.e., does mental
incapacity to manage himself or his affairs exist.23 A person may be
is See United States v. Wescoat, 49 F.2d 193, 196 (4th Cir. 1931) ; Standard
Oil Co. v. Johnson, 299 Fed. 93, 98 (1st Cir. 1924); McCoamiccK, EvmiDNcE§ 238 (1954). In this connection it is interesting to note Matter of First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 198 Misc. 919, 103 N.Y.S.2d 491 (Surr. Ct.), aff'd inem.,
277 App. Div. 1158, 101 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (4th Dep't 1950), which foreshadowed
the White case. The court there denied a motion made pursuant to § 295 of
the Civil Practice Act, to perpetuate testimony given in a lunacy proceeding by
two witnesses of advanced age. A will contest was anticipated upon the death
of the lunatic who had executed a will prior to the lunacy inquest. In denying
the motion, the court made no mention of the possibility that such testimony
would be admissible in the probate proceeding under § 348 of the Civil Practice
Act.
"I Cf. UmoRm RULES OF EVIDEMC, Rule 63(3), which states that testimony
given in a prior proceeding is admissible in a subsequent action when ". . . the
issue is such that the adverse party on the former occasion had the right and
opportunity for cross examination with an interest and inotive similar to that
which the adverse party has in the action in which the testimony is offered...."
(emphasis added). On the importance of motive in cross-examination generally,
see McCoRmicx, EvmDNac § 233 (1954) ; 5 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 1386 (3d ed.
1940).
20 See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 1371 (which states that a lunacy proceeding
is confined to the issue of sanity at that time).21 Matter of White, 2 N.Y2d 309, 313, 141 N.E.2d 416, 418 (1957).
22 Hughes v. Jones, 116 N.Y. 67, 77, 22 N.E. 446, 449 (1889).23 See N.Y. Crv. PAc. Ace § 1356 which extends the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court ".... to the custody of the person and the care of the property
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incapable of managing himself or his affairs and still have the ability
to execute a valid will 4
An adjudication of insanity is not regarded as a conclusive find-
ing of testamentary incapacity,2 5 raising instead only a presumption
to that effect.2 6 It is difficult to see how this could be possible if there
were not some fundamental difference in issue between mental in-
competency and the ability to make a valid will.
The decision in the instant case opens the way to the introduc-
tion of collateral issues into insanity proceedings. Since the testimony
offered as to a person's sanity at the time of a lunacy inquest may
later be introduced in a probate proceeding, relatives of the testator
will certainly have a vmtive to cross-examine witnesses on the issue
of testamentary capacity at a lunacy inquest. Whether they can do
so and stay within the rules of relevancy is questionable.27 Whether
they can do so intelligently so as to protect their interests is highly
dubious. Without knowing the terms of the will, or whether a will
even exists, ignorance of the facts may prevent prospective benefi-
ciaries from adequately protecting their interests.
Existing discovery statutes 28 would not permit them to look for
a will. Legislation to allow discovery of a will in lunacy proceedings
would be in accord with the purposes of discovery statutes 2 9 but may
be in conflict with a person's privilege of keeping his testamentary
intentions private. To fulfill the purpose of such an enactment, the
will would have to be opened before the testator had actually been
declared insane. However, since the legislature has full power to
regulate the testamentary privilege,8 0 this conflict could easily be
overcome.
of a person incompetent to manage himself or his affairs in consequence of
lunacy... " Ibid.2*See Keely v. Moore, 196 U.S. 38 (1904); Lucas v. Parsons, 27 Ga. 593
(1859) ; Lewandowski v. Zuzak, 305 Ill. 612, 137 N.E. 500 (1922) ; McLoughlin
v. Sheehan, 250 Mass. 132, 145 N.E. 259 (1924) ; In re Draper's Estate, 215 Pa.
314, 64 AUt. 520 (1906) ; Tate v. Chumbley, 190 Va. 480, 57 S.E.2d 151 (1950).25 Keely v. Moore, note 24 supra; Matter of Charap, 4 M.2d 627, 140
N.Y.S2d 92 (Surr. Ct.), aff'd mern., 286 App. Div. 1000, 145 N.Y.S.2d 311(1st Dep't 1955) ; In re Drapers Estate, note 24 supra; Western State Hospital
v. Wininger, 196 Va. 300, 83 S.E2d 446 (1954) ; cf. Wadsworth v. Sharpsteen,
8 N.Y. 388, 396 (1853).26 Matter of Widmayer, 74 App. Div. 336, 77 N.Y. Supp. 663 (1st Dep't
1902) ; Matter of Coe, 47 App. Div. 177, 62 N.Y. Supp. 376 (3d Dep't 1900);
Matter of Rice, 173 Misc. 1038, 19 N.Y.S2d 602 (Surr. Ct 1940).2 7 N.Y. Civ. P.Aa AcT § 1371.
2 8 N.Y. Crv. PRAc. Ac §§ 1377-a, 1377-b; N.Y. Sum. CT. Acr § 137.
29 See Matter of Johnson, 253 App. Div. 698, 3 N.Y.S2d 837 (2d Dep't
1938).
so Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556 (1942) ; Rubin v. Irving Trust Co.,
305 N.Y. 288, 113 N.E.2d 424 (1953); Matter of del Drago, 287 N.Y. 61,
38 N.E.2d 131 (1941), rezd on other grounds sub norn. Riggs v. del Drago,
317 U.S. 95 (1942); Matter of Hills, 264 N.Y. 349, 191 N.E. 12 (1934).
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Perhaps the most significant problem raised by the present case
is the interpretation to be given the words "subject-matter." If
"subject-matter," as used in the statute, has a broader meaning than
"issue," as used in the common law, possible applications of the stat-
ute are proportionately increased. The relation of lunacy proceedings
to probate proceedings is only one aspect of the problem. The rela-
tions between other actions which may at first blush seem to be dis-
tinctly different in "issue" may be similar in "subject-matter" and
testimony may be carried over from one to the other. The exact con-
tent and limits to be given "subject-matter" will, however, have to
await further judicial pronouncements.
X
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - SECTION 21 OF NEW YORK
CIVIL PRACTICE ACT HELD APPLICABLE TO SUSPEND Two-YEAR
PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS IN WRONGFUL DEATH AcTiON.-Plaintiff-
administratrix brought a wrongful death action against defendant-
administrator two years and nine months after the death of plaintiff's
intestate. Defendant claimed that the two-year period of limitation
under Section 130 of the New York Decedent Estate Law was a bar
to the action. Plaintiff relied upon Section 21 of the New York Civil
Practice Act which provides that in the case of the death of a person
who would have been liable if he had lived, a period of eighteen
months is not a part of the period of limitation for the commencement
of an action against his executor or administrator. The Appellate
Division held that Section 21 was applicable and suspended the run-
ning of the statute of limitations for eighteen months. McDonough
v. Cestare, 3 A.D.2d 201, 159 N.Y.S.2d 616 (2d Dep't 1957).*
When the legislature, which has the power to create a new right
otherwise unknown to the law, does so, and in the statute of creation
imposes a limitation, such limitation is part of the grant of power.
The time within which such action may be instituted is subject to
such limitation and to no other limitation.1 A contrary view holds
that the problem is basically one of statutory construction and the
fact that the limitation is contained in the statute of creation is but
one factor to consider in interpreting the legislative intent.2
* Motion for leave to appeal denied, 3 A.D.2d 861, 163 N.Y.S.2d 376 (2d
Dep't 1957).
1Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926) ; The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199
(1886); Cimo v. New York, 306 N.Y. 143, 116 N.E.2d 290 (1953); Gatti
Paper Stock Corp. v. Erie R.R., 247 App. Div. 45, 268 N.Y. Supp. 669 (1st
Dep't), aff'd mnem., 272 N.Y. 535, 4 N.E.2d 724 (1936).
2 "... [T]he fact that the limitation is contained in the same section or
the same statute is material only as bearing on construction. It is merely a
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